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Reassessment of DI entitlement under more stringent criteria removed 14.4 percent of 
recipients from the program and reduced benefits by 20 percent, on average. In response, 
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able to increase earnings by €0.64 for each €1 of DI income lost. Female and younger 
recipients, as well as those with more subjectively defined disabilities, were able to increase 
earnings most. The earnings response declined as claim duration lengthened, suggesting 
that earnings capacity deteriorates while on DI. The deterioration was steepest for male, 
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appears to slow the deterioration of earnings capacity.
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1 Introduction
Stricter screening of disability insurance (DI) applications can reduce entry to the program
(Autor and Duggan 2003; Gruber and Kubik 1997; De Jong et al. 2011), but it does nothing
to raise the typically low rate of exit. It can slow the growth of spending on DI, but it
will take time to reduce the stock of benefit recipients and so lighten the fiscal burden
of a program that has become the largest item of social insurance expenditure in many
countries. More immediate program savings can be made by cutting the benefits paid to
current recipients of DI. However, the fiscal impact of this policy, as well as its consequences
for the wellbeing of program beneficiaries, depends on the earnings capacity of the benefit
recipients. Only if a sufficient number of them have the potential to replace a substantial
fraction of their benefit income with labor market earnings, will it be possible to make cuts to
DI without jeopardizing recipients’ financial wellbeing and merely shifting the fiscal burden
to other social transfer programs. Yet there is little evidence on the earnings capacity of
DI recipients and the extent to which they can be induced to realize it through program
retrenchment.
Much of the evidence on the earnings crowd-out from DI comes from studies that follow
Bound (1989) in using the earnings of rejected applicants to place an upper bound on the
earnings capacity of successful applicants (Chen and Van der Klaauw 2008; Von Wachter
et al. 2011). Exploitation of plausibly exogenous variation in the award or appeal probability
can eliminate upward bias in estimated earnings capacity at the time of application (Autor
et al. 2017; French and Song 2014; Maestas et al. 2013). However, this strategy will underes-
timate the impact of DI on employment and earnings if, as Autor et al. (2015) demonstrate
for the US Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, work capacity and/or pref-
erences decay during the time it takes for an application to be adjudicated. Further, it will
overestimate the earnings potential of the stock of beneficiaries if skills and preferences for
work deteriorate with time spent on DI. Evidence obtained from comparison of accepted and
rejected applicants is pertinent to the impact of policies that tighten entry to DI. It is less
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relevant to assessing the potential of reforms that aim to release the earnings capacity of
recipients of DI benefits.
This paper provides evidence on the earnings capacity of the universe of Dutch DI benefit
recipients aged 30-44 years. It uses administrative data to estimate the impact on employ-
ment, earnings and social transfers of a 2004 reform that increased stringency of the DI
program, resulting in the termination of the claims of some benefit recipients and substan-
tial cuts in the amounts paid to others. The Netherlands is known for a DI dependency rate
that reached 12% of the insured population at the beginning of the 1990s, while also being
commended for a series of reforms, including the one we study, that are claimed to have
contributed to a two-fifths reduction in DI dependency (Koning and Lindeboom 2015). Offi-
cials and analysts in countries, such as the US, searching for ways to manage the escalating
fiscal burden of DI can potentially learn from the Dutch experience (Autor 2015; Burkhauser
et al. 2014). By examining a reform that occurred a decade into the rationalization process
when the dependency rate had already fallen considerably, we deliver evidence that is more
relevant to the situation prevailing in other countries than the evaluation of an earlier Dutch
reform conducted by Borghans et al. (2014).
We identify the effect of the reform by comparing the pre-post change in earnings (and
other outcomes) of benefit recipients aged 30-44, whose DI entitlement was reassessed under
stricter criteria, with the respective change among older recipients, who were not reassessed.
Unlike other studies that rely on difference-in-differences (DID) across age groups to identify
effects of more stringent criteria at application for DI (Karlstro¨m et al. 2008; Staubli 2011),
we adjust for the difference between the age groups in the outcome trend over a period prior
to the reform. This trend-adjusted DID (Bell et al. 1999) eliminates age-specific trends, as
well as period effects. Identification rests on the assumption that, in the absence of the
reform, the age differential in the outcome trends would have been that observed in the
earlier period. Consistent with this, we demonstrate that the age differential in the trends
is similar over multiple periods prior to the reform. A placebo test also lends credibility to
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the identification: implementing the empirical strategy with data on individuals who are not
DI benefit recipients, we find no effect of a pseudo reform on earnings. Applying the same
strategy with data on DI recipients, we estimate that the increased stringency induced them
to raise their earnings by 18 percent.
The paper makes four contributions to evidence on the work and earnings capacity of
DI recipients. First, it is one of only a few studies of younger program beneficiaries. DI
recipients below middle age account for an increasing share of DI rolls (OECD 2014). They
would be expected to have the greatest earnings capacity and are likely to be the principal
target of any attempt to cut benefits. Borghans et al. (2014) estimate earnings capacity at
the age of 45 using cuts to DI benefits that were made ten years before the reform we use.
We find that the effects on the employment and earnings of younger recipients aged 30-39
are roughly twice the magnitude of the effects on recipients aged 40-44. This is not only
because the benefits of younger recipients were cut more aggressively. They also replaced a
larger fraction of their lost benefits with earnings. The only other paper that has estimated
the employment (but not earnings) response to DI benefit cuts (in this case terminations)
among recipients younger than 45 is restricted to examination of the 2% of DI beneficiaries
in the US who had qualified for the program, at least in part, through alcohol or drug
addiction (Moore 2015).1 This group is not necessarily indicative of the earnings capacity,
and preferences, of the majority of benefit recipients with more prevalent conditions.
Second, precisely because the qualification rules were tightened for all claimants irre-
spective of the nature of their disability, we are able to compare earnings capacity across DI
beneficiaries qualifying through different diagnoses. This is relevant to assessing the credi-
bility of one of the main proposed explanations of lengthening DI rolls. That is, loosening of
the criteria for entitlement from precisely defined medical diagnoses to the vaguer concept
of work capacity opened the door to claims based on health conditions that are difficult to
1Moore also finds that the employment response is negatively associated with age. Two other papers
also find a larger (in magnitude) elasticity of labor supply with respect to DI at younger ages (Kostol and
Mogstad 2014; Von Wachter et al. 2011), although these studies do not identify from variation arising from
benefit cuts.
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verify medically (Autor 2015; Autor and Duggan 2006). Lower back pain and stress-related
problems are the stereotypical examples. In 2012 across all OECD countries, individuals
suffering from mental health disorders constituted one half of DI benefit recipients and 27-
47% of new awards (OECD 2012). Musculoskeletal problems are typically the second most
common reason given for a DI claim. If this explanation for the growth of DI programs is
correct, then claimants with these more subjectively defined conditions should have greater
earnings capacity. Evidence on this hypothesis obtained from comparisons between accepted
and rejected DI applicants in the US is contradictory (French and Song 2014; Maestas et al.
2013; Von Wachter et al. 2011).2 Consistent with the hypothesis, Moore (2015) finds that
recipients with a primary diagnosis of a mental health or a musculoskeletal condition were
more likely to work after their benefits were terminated. But, as mentioned above, this paper
examines only a small proportion of DI benefit recipients who partly qualified though addic-
tion. We provide the first test of the hypothesis using data on a universe of those receiving
DI benefits, who are all subjected to the same tightening of entitlement rules that did not
involve any change in the medical criteria for qualification. Consistent with the hypothesis,
we find that the earnings responses of those with mental health and musculoskeletal condi-
tions are approximately twice as large as the impact on the earnings of those qualifying for
DI through all other diagnoses.
Our third contribution is to add to the meager evidence on whether and how the earnings
capacity of DI recipients varies with time on the program. The longer someone is claiming
DI, the more their skills may be expected to deteriorate and their work preferences dissipate
(Bryngelson 2009; Svensson et al. 2010; Ving˚ard et al. 2004). These negative effects of
claim duration are potentially offset by time on DI providing the opportunity for health and
work capacity to partially recover from any illness that does not cause permanent disability.
2Von Wachter et al. (2011) find in favor of the hypothesis. Maestas et al. (2013) correct for unobservable
differences between accepted and rejected DI applicants and find no evidence that those reporting mental
health and musculoskeletal conditions have greater work capacity. In fact, they find the work capacity of
applicants with musculoskeletal problems to be lower than average. French and Song (2014), who also correct
for unobservables, arrive at the opposite conclusion: those with musculoskeletal problems have greater work
capacity.
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Moore (2015) finds that the employment response to DI termination first increases with the
duration of a claim before the relationship turns negative after about three years, which
is consistent with the health recovery effect first dominating before being overcome by the
labor market detachment effect. But there is little or no supporting evidence of this inverted
U-shaped relationship between work capacity and DI duration. Autor et al. (2015) find that
employment and earnings fall even as the time waiting for a US SSDI application to be
decided lengthens. Gelber et al. (2017) estimate income effects of SSDI benefits on earnings
and find that they vary little with the duration of a claim. Using claim durations of up to 15
years, which is substantially longer than in these other studies, we also do not find evidence
of an inverted U relationship. Over the full sample, the earning response to benefit cuts
declines continuously with time on DI. The decline is steeper for male and younger benefit
recipients.
The final contribution of the paper is to assess whether the option of partial disability,
which permits beneficiaries of the Dutch DI program to permanently earn in excess of the
equivalent of the substantial gainful activity (SGA) limit beyond which SSDI benefits are
terminated in the US, helps recipients to maintain and reach their earnings capacity.3 The
provision for partial disability makes the Dutch program a forerunner of return-to-work
incentives later introduced or contemplated elsewhere (Kostol and Mogstad 2014). Autor
(2015) argues that SSDI should introduce the option of partial disability to reduce the
tendency for benefit recipients to become detached from the labor market. If the measure
achieves this, then the earnings capacity of the partially disabled who continue to work
should decline less with time on DI. Our estimates are consistent with this hypothesis. The
positive impact of reassessment under more stringent rules on earnings declines steeply with
claim duration for both the fully disabled and the partially disabled who were not working
at the time of reassessment. In contrast, among the partially disabled who were working,
the effect on the earnings of those who had been on DI for 15 years is as strong as that after
3Among the recipients targeted by the reform we study, approximately half were permitted to earn in
excess of an amount equivalent to the SGA without having their benefits reduced.
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a claim spell of only a year.
Our results suggest that some Dutch DI benefit recipients had considerable earnings
capacity that cuts to their benefit could induce them to exercise. Application of the more
stringent rules is estimated to have reduced the amount of DI income received by 20 percent,
raised employment by 20 percent and increased earnings by 18 percent, on average. These
estimates imply high elasticities of employment and earnings with respect to DI income. 4
Each e1.00 reduction in disability benefits is estimated to have been replaced by e0.64 of
labor earnings. This is similar to the estimate obtained by Borghans et al. (2014) based
on cuts to Dutch DI benefits implemented ten years before those we examine. Even after a
decade of retrenchment, some recipients of DI still had considerable earnings capacity they
could realize to replace around two thirds of substantial losses in benefits. However, it is
important to keep in mind that these were the minority of the stock of DI beneficiaries. Most
of those who were subjected to reassessment under more stringent criteria did not have their
benefits reduced.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines key features of the Dutch DI program
and the reform we evaluate. Section 3 sets out our identification strategy. Section 4 describes
the data and examines trends in the outcomes. Section 5 presents the results starting with full
sample estimates, then a placebo test, then heterogeneous effects and, finally, examination
of relationships between earnings capacity and duration of a DI claim. The final section
concludes.
4The estimated reduction in benefits includes the withdrawal of payments to claimants who were induced,
but not forced, by the cuts to leave DI. It overestimates the cut in DI income that arises mechanically from
application of the more stringent rules. Consequently, our estimates imply an elasticity of employment with
respect to (offered) DI income that is less than -1, and an elasticity of earnings less than -0.9 (=18/-20).
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2 Dutch disability insurance
2.1 Eligibility and benefits
The 2004 reform changed the details but not the general procedures for assessing DI eligibility
and benefit entitlement. Before describing the reform, we summarize those procedures.
An application to DI for full disability benefits can be submitted after a period of sick pay,
which was one year in 2004.5 Application for partial disability benefits can be made while in
work. The social security administration makes a medical assessment to establish whether
the applicant is completely incapable of work. If the agency’s physician judges that the
applicant has some residual work capacity, then a vocational expert assesses the applicant
to identify specific occupations, from a very detailed list, that she is considered capable
of performing, taking into account her educational attainment. Earnings capacity is then
approximated by the average salary across the three highest paying of those occupations in
which there are jobs available.6 Degree of disability is defined as the proportionate shortfall
of this earnings capacity from pre-disability earnings. If the estimated degree of disability is
below a threshold, which in 2004 was 15%, then the claim is rejected.7 A degree of disability
of at least 80% corresponds to fully disability and maximum benefits. The claimant is
compensated for approximately 70% of her lost earnings capacity.8
The benefit recipient is permitted to do paid work without the loss of benefits but only
up to the maximum earnings consistent with her assessed degree of disability. Earning above
that maximum results in downward revision of the degree of disability and a reduced benefit
payment. After leaving DI, benefits continue to be received during a three-month trial period
before entitlement is terminated.
Prior to the reform, outflow from DI was low. Work capacity was reassessed one year
5After 2004, the sick pay period was extended to two years.
6The salary attached to each occupation is the average paid to those engaged in it.
7The minimum degree of disability was increased to 35% in 2006 for new applicants but not existing
recipients.
8Specifically, the replacement rate is set at 70% of the mid-point of each of the intervals of the degree of
disability shown in Appendix A, Table A1.
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after a claim was awarded and every five years thereafter. These reassessments were often
based on no more than the recipient’s response to a postal questionnaire.
2.2 The 2004 Reform
From October 2004, the stock of about 275,000 DI benefit recipients younger than 50 on
July 1, 2004 became eligible for reassessment under more stringent criteria.9 The outcome
could be complete or partial withdrawal of benefits.
Benefit recipients were required to undergo medical assessment by a physician. All had
their degree of disability re-evaluated under stricter rules that could result in upward revision
of current earnings capacity and downward revision of pre-disability earnings. For any given
health condition and associated functional limitations, degree of disability under the new
rules could not be greater than it was under the old rules. In many cases, it would be lower
and result in a reduction or termination of benefits.
The main reason benefit entitlement could be revised downward was that earnings capac-
ity was now estimated by averaging over the three highest paying occupations the claimant
was considered able to perform that each had at least three job vacancies. Previously, only
occupations with at least ten vacant jobs had qualified. In addition, jobs requiring Dutch
language proficiency and knowledge of information technology were now considered feasible
even if the claimant did not possess those skills. Full-time employment and night work were
now also considered feasible even if the claimant had not previously engaged in those types
of employment. As a result of these expansions of the pool of potential work, the average
wage over the three highest paying occupations considered feasible was likely to rise. It
could not fall. A rise in assessed earnings capacity meant a fall in benefit entitlement. In
addition, pre-disability earnings could be reduced by a new rule that truncated weekly hours
at a maximum of 38. If earnings had been inflated by previously working more than this,
9The reform was legislated in April 2004 and the initial plan was to start the reassessments from July 2004.
Because of strong political opposition and lack of consensus about the reassessment criteria, implementation
was pushed back to October. Analysis in section 4.3 of trends in employment and earnings prior to the start
of the reassessments does not reveal patterns consistent with anticipation effects on these outcomes.
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then there would be a downward revision of lost earnings capacity, and so benefits.
These changes resulted in around one third of all reassessed benefit recipients having their
benefits reduced or terminated (Social Insurance Benefits Agency (UWV) 2009). About a
fifth had their degree of disability reassessed to be below the 15% minimum threshold.
Consequently, their DI entitlement was withdrawn completely. Another 12% were allowed
to remain on DI but with lower benefits. Over three fifths (62%) experienced no change
in their entitlement. Deterioration in health since the previous assessment resulted in 6%
of recipients having their benefits raised despite application of the more stringent rules (see
Appendix A Table A2).
If the outcome of reassessment was a downward revision in the degree of disability, then
benefits were reduced or terminated two months later. If employment was not secured,
a disqualified DI recipient could transfer to unemployment insurance (UI) if she was still
eligible for that program. If not, or if the disqualified claimant had less than six moths of UI
entitlement remaining, then application could be made to a temporary program put in place
specifically to cushion the short term impact of the reform. This maintained DI income at
the same level for a period of six months (increased to twelve months in 2007). Around 18%
of claimants whose entitlements were reduced or terminated were granted benefits from this
program (Social Insurance Benefits Agency (UWV) 2009).
The reassessments were undertaken between October 2004 and the end of 2008. Initially,
the plan was to reassess all younger benefit recipients before moving to older groups, but
this was not adhered to. In 2007, strong criticism of the policy and a change of government
resulted in the age threshold for reassessment being revised from less than 50 to less than
45 on July 1, 2004. As a result, around 25,000 recipients aged 45-49 who had already been
reassessed were assessed once more under the old, more lenient rules (Ministry of Justice
2007). Consequently, we restrict attention to benefit recipients aged 30-44 on July 1, 2004.
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3 Identification & Estimation
3.1 Identification
We estimate labor supply responses to reassessment under more stringent entitlement rules,
and use these to infer the employment and earnings potential of benefit recipients. To
estimate the average effect of reassessment on recipients aged 30-44, we need a comparison
group, or groups, that allows credible identification of the average outcome that would have
materialized in the target group if the reform had not been implemented.
Let Yit be the observed outcome of individual i at time t, and let Y
1
it and Y
0
it represent
potential outcomes with and without reassessment respectively. Let t=0 indicate some time
before the commencement of reassessments, such that Yi0 = Y
0
i0 ∀i. In our main analysis,
we use annual data and t=0 corresponds to 2004. Let t=4 be four years later in 2008 when
the reassessments were completed. Then, Yi4 = DiY
1
i4 + (1 −Di)Y 0i4, where Di = 1 if i has
been reassessed and is 0 otherwise. We wish to estimate the average effect of reassessment
on those reassessed: ATET = E [Y 1i4 − Y 0i4 | Di = 1].
One identification strategy would rely on a difference-in-differences (DID) comparison
between younger benefit recipients (30-44 on July 1, 2004) who were subject to reassessment
and older recipients (50+ on July 1, 2004) who were not.10 This is likely to be problematic,
particularly as the age gap widens. Older DI beneficiaries have a lower probability of return-
ing to work and recovering their earnings than younger recipients, even when the latter are
not subject to reassessment.
An alternative comparison group would be DI recipients who are the same age as those
targeted by the reform but who are observed in a period that ends before the reassessments
begin. If in the absence of the reassessments the mean outcome of this age group would
have changed during the period in which the reform took place by the amount observed for
10Those aged 45-49 on July 1, 2004 are not useful either as a treatment group or a comparison group
since some of them were first reassessed under the new, stricter rules and then (after 2007) assessed once
again under the initial, more lenient rules.
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the same age group in the earlier period of equal length, then the DID across periods will
identify the average effect of the reassessments. The threat to this identification strategy
comes from period-specific labor market conditions and any earlier changes in DI that would
invalidate using the earlier period to identify counterfactual employment and earnings of the
target age group in the reform period.11
The strategy we adopt makes use of both comparison groups – older benefit recipients in
the same period and recipients of the same age in an earlier period – to identify the impact of
increased stringency under an assumption that is plausibly (although not necessarily) weaker
than each assumption required to construct the counterfactual from one of the two compar-
ison groups alone. We use a four-year interval running from 1999 to 2003 (PERIODi = 0)
that precedes the reform to identify the extent to which the trend in the average outcome
of younger DI recipients aged 30-44 (AGEi = 1) differs from the trend of older recipients,
whom we define as aged from 50 to 53 (AGEi = 0). Effectively, we subtract this differential
trend in the non-reform period from the DID of the outcome between the age groups over
the four-year reform period from 2004 to 2008 (PERIODi = 1) during which the younger
age group was reassessed. This differential trend adjusted difference-in-differences (DADID)
(Bell et al. 1999; Blundell and Costa Dias 2002) relaxes the assumption of common trends
in earnings (/employment) across age groups in the absence of the reform. It also avoids
the assumption of common trends in earnings for a given age group across periods. The
assumption that is required for identification of the ATET is that the age differential in the
11One DI reform implemented in 2002 is credited with having substantially reduced the rate of inflow
into DI (De Jong et al. 2011; Van Sonsbeek and Gradus 2012; Koning and Lindeboom 2015). It made the
employer and the employee jointly responsible for taking active measures to enable the latter to continue
working during the waiting period for DI. Any impact on the DI exit rate, as well as the employment
and earnings of existing DI claimants, which are relevant in the present context, would be indirect. Such
effects cannot be entirely ruled out and so comparing 30-44 year old DI recipients in 2004-2008 with their
counterparts in an earlier period spanning 2002 could possibly be problematic. However, there is no reason
to expect the 2002 reform to have affected younger recipients differentially from older recipients. Provided
it did not, then it does not jeopardize the validity of the identification strategy we use.
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trends in earnings would have been common across periods in the absence of the reform:
E
[
Y 0i4 − Y 0i0 | AGEi = 1, PERIODi = 1
]− E [Y 0i4 − Y 0i0 | AGEi = 0, PERIODi = 1]
= E
[
Y 0i4 − Y 0i0 | AGEi = 1, PERIODi = 0
]− E [Y 0i4 − Y 0i0 | AGEi = 0, PERIODi = 0]
(1)
If this assumption holds, then any widening of the age differential in the trends that occurs in
the reform period relative to the non-reform period can be attributed to a positive impact of
reassessment on the earnings of younger benefit recipients. The average effect of reassessment
on those reassessed is then given by the DADID:
E
[
Yi4 | AGEi = 1, PERIODi = 1
]− E [Yi0 | AGEi = 1, PERIODi = 1]
−
(
E
[
Yi4 | AGEi = 0, PERIODi = 1
]− E [Yi0 | AGEi = 0, PERIODi = 1])
−
{(
E
[
Yi4 | AGEi = 1, PERIODi = 0
]− E [Yi0 | AGEi = 1, PERIODi = 0])
−
(
E
[
Yi4 | AGEi = 0, PERIODi = 0
]− E [Yi0 | AGEi = 0, PERIODi = 0])}
(2)
In section 4.3, we assess the plausibility of the assumption that the age differential in the
earnings (/employment) trends would have been the same across the periods if no reassess-
ments had been conducted between 2004 and 2008 by comparing age differences in outcome
trends across periods in which there was no reform. If the reform was anticipated by benefit
recipients who reacted by leaving DI and entering employment already in 2004, then our
strategy will deliver lower bound estimates of its impact. But examination of pre-reform
trends does not reveal patterns across the outcomes indicative of anticipation. In section
5.2, we further assess the credibility of the strategy by checking that it gives a zero effect on
the earnings (/employment) of individuals who were not DI benefit recipients and so were
not exposed to the reform.
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3.2 Estimation
To estimate the effects, we pool balanced panels of DI recipients from the reform and non-
reform periods. At entry to the panel, which is January 1, 2004 and January 1, 1999 for the
reform and non-reform periods respectively, every observation is receiving DI benefits. In the
reform period panel, the treated recipients are aged 30-44 on July 1, 2004. The comparison
group obtained from this panel is aged 50-53 on July 1, 2004. In the non-reform period
panel, we distinguish between those aged 30-44 and those aged 50-53 on July 1, 1999.
We use least squares to estimate fixed effects models with the following structure,
Yit =
4∑
t=1
βtAGEi × PERIODi × Y EARt +
4∑
t=1
θtY EARt
+
4∑
t=1
γtAGEi × Y EARt +
4∑
t=1
δtPERIODi × Y EARt + µi + εit,
(3)
where Y EARt is an indicator of the within panel year of the observation, such that Y EAR0 =
1 & PERIODi = 1 indicates 2004, Y EAR0 = 1 & PERIODi = 0 indicates 1999 and
Y EAR4 = 1 indicates 2008 or 2003 depending on the value of PERIODi, µi is an individual
fixed effect and εit is an idiosyncratic error. In addition to period effects and age effects that
differ between the periods, both of which are captured by the fixed effects, this model allows
within panel time effects (θt) that differ across age groups (γt) and periods (δt). The period-
specific level effects and trends allow for the fact that the periods 1999-2003 and 2004-2008
span different phases of the business cycle. Growth was decelerating in the earlier period
and accelerating in the later period. The age-specific trends allow for the possibility that,
within each period, average earnings (employment) of the younger group of DI recipients
does not move in parallel to that of the older group.
Subject to the identification assumption (1), βt corresponds to the average effect of the
reassessments t years after they started. Prior to t = 4, corresponding to 2008 in the reform
period, these are intention to treat effects since not all benefit recipients in the target group
aged 30-44 had been reassessed before then. The evolution of these intention to treat effects is
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not so interesting - it simply reflects the cumulative increase in the number of reassessments
(See Appendix A Table A3). We focus on the estimate of β4, which corresponds to the
ATET when the reassessments had been completed.
Taking differences from 2004 introduces a slight inaccuracy because 1% of reassessments
were carried in the last quarter of 2004. Further, while effectively all recipients aged 30-44
had been reassessed by the end of 2008,12 around 3% were reassessed during that year. The
full effect of reassessment on these recipients may not be reflected in earnings averaged over
2008. To allow for both potential inaccuracies, we test robustness of the main estimates to
using monthly data that allow us to take differences between September 2004 and December
2008.13
4 Data
4.1 Sources and measures
We obtain data on all recipients of DI benefits from social security files, which record degree of
disability, benefit amount, claim duration and main diagnosis. We use these data to estimate
the effect of the reform on the probability of receiving DI and the (annual) amount received.
Diagnosis recorded on entry to DI is used to distinguish claimants in the two diagnostic
groups that include the most subjectively defined disabilities - musculoskeletal conditions
and mental disorders. We lump all other disabilities together. The social security files
are also used to identify benefits received from other social insurance and social assistance
programs, which we aggregate to obtain annual net of tax income from social transfers other
than DI.
Information on employment, days worked and annual net of tax earnings is taken from
12 Only 91 out of 160,194 claimants aged 30-44 in July 2004 were not reassessed until the first five months
of 2009.
13We do not use the more disaggregated data throughout because they are more noisy and the dataset
becomes extremely large, which slows computation considerably on the remote server through which the
administrative files are accessed.
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tax records. We count a person as employed if she was an employee for at least one day in
a calendar year. Annual earnings are divided by days worked to obtain a daily wage.
Municipal registers are used to identify date of birth and gender. Deaths are identified
from the mortality register. The administrative files are linked using a unique individual
identification number (RIN-code) that is issued on compulsory registration with the munic-
ipality at birth or after immigration. Additional details of the data sources and measures
are provided in Appendix A Table A4.
4.2 Treatment and comparison groups
To construct the reform period sample, we select individuals who were claiming DI in January
2004. Of these, 3.9% die before the end of 2008 and are dropped from the panel. Mortality
obviously differs between the age groups. But the age differential in mortality rates does
not differ between the reform and non-reform periods. Hence, conditioning on survival does
not introduce any compositional change that would bias the DADID estimates. We drop
benefit recipients aged 45-49 on July 1, 2004 because the 2007 revision to the reform meant
that either they were never reassessed under the stricter rules or they had their reassessment
reversed. We also exclude recipients younger than 30 because there are very few of them and
they typically have had little employment experience. Their employment patterns are likely
to differ markedly from the older claimants we use as one comparison group. This leaves a
treatment group of 160,194 individuals who were claiming DI in January 2004, were aged
30-44 on July 1, 2004 and so were eligible for reassessment and could be followed to the end
of 2008 when the reassessments were completed.14
One of our comparison groups comprises 94,404 individuals who were claiming DI in
14The number of benefit recipients from this group who were called for reassessment is 137,419. Most
(94%) of the others had a condition that was considered, without being subject to the full reassessment
process, to render them completely incapable of work. These cases were reviewed and so are part of the
treatment group. The remainder (6%) left DI before being called for reassessment. Since this exit may
have been in anticipation of the outcome of reassessment, these individuals can be considered to have been
exposed to the reform and are rightly part of the treatment group. Their inclusion will downwardly bias the
DADID estimate only if they exited from DI already in 2004 (or October 2004 in the monthly analysis).
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January 2004, were aged 50-53 on July 1, 2004 and so were not subject to reassessment. The
non-reform period sample consists of individuals who were claiming DI in January 1999, were
aged either 30-44 (as the treatment group, 139,524 individuals) or 50-53 (as reform period
comparison group, 102,464 individuals) on July 1, 1999, and survived to the end of 2003.
We pool this balanced panel with that constructed for the reform period.
Table 1 shows means of characteristics at selection into the samples, i.e. 1999 and 2004,
by age group and period. In both age groups, there is a higher fraction of females in the
later period. This partly reflects increasing labor force participation of Dutch women and is
consistent with the feminization of DI rolls observed in other countries. More relevant to the
plausibility of our identification strategy is that the age group difference in the proportion
of female benefit recipients is roughly constant across the two periods. The same is true
with respect to the average duration of a DI claim and the amount received. There is a
discernible age group difference in the proportion of fully disabled claimants only in the
earlier, non-reform period. Related to this, only in this period does the employment rate
differ across the age groups, with the older benefit recipients being less likely to work (and
more likely to be fully disabled). Consequently, the age difference in mean earnings is in the
opposite direction in the two periods. These period differences in the gaps in the levels of
employment and earnings between the age groups do not invalidate the DADID identification
strategy. We examine whether there is any sign of the age-specific trends diverging up to
the implementation of the reform in the next sub-section.
For both age groups, mean incomes from social transfer programs other than DI are
higher at the start of the reform period than at the start of the non-reform period, and the
age gap is somewhat wider in the reform period. The increase over time may well be due
to the rise in the proportion of benefit recipients with mental health problems, who tend
to be more heavily dependent on welfare. Combined with recipients with musculoskeletal
conditions, they are the majority in all age groups and periods, and more so in the later
period. In the earlier period, there is no age difference in the fraction of recipients with either
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Table 1: Characteristics of DI recipients by period and age - Means at sample entry
Reform period Non-reform period
Age 30-44 Age 50-53 Age 30-44 Age 50-53
Demographics
Female 60.3% 45.7% 53.4% 37.4%
Age 38.7 52.1 38.8 52.1
Disability insurance
Claim duration (years) 5.44 9.52 5.90 9.96
Benefit amount (e/year) 8422 9950 8559 10634
Fully disabled 63.5% 64.0% 65.4% 69.4%
Labor market
Employed 35.9% 35.8% 40.7% 34.6%
Earnings (e/year) 4207 5162 4947 4879
Other social transfers
Benefit amount (e/year) 1043 726 724 555
Diagnosis
Mental disorders 43.1% 33.8% 34.4% 27.9%
Musculoskeletal 28.9% 32.9% 25.0% 31.2%
Other disabilities 28.0% 33.3% 40.6% 40.9%
Number of Observations 160,194 94,404 139,524 102,464
Note: The Reform period panel refers to DI benefit recipients selected in January 2004. The Non-reform
period panel refers to those selected in January 1999. Columns within each panel are split by age on July 1,
2004 (Reform period) and July 1, 1999 (Non-reform period). The first column in the Reform period panel
corresponds to the treatment group. All others are for comparison groups. Earnings and benefit amounts
are annual, net of taxes and inflated to 2015 price levels (Eurostat Netherlands HCPI 2015).
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of these two more subjectively defined conditions. But in the later reform period, recipients
in the younger group are more likely to have these diagnoses. This gives further reason to
perform disaggregated analysis by diagnosis.
4.3 Trends
Figure 1 shows difference-in-differences in receipt of DI benefits, employment and labor
earnings between the two age groups within each period. These figures are drawn using
monthly data to allow more detailed assessment of the evolution of the trends before and
after the start of the reassessments. Each line traces the age group difference (30-44 years
- 50-53 years) in the deviation of the respective outcome from its value in month 0, which
is October 2004 in the reform period, when reassessments started, and October 1999 in the
non-reform period. After month 0, the difference in the DID between the periods corresponds
to the DADID and gives an initial impression of the impact of the reform. By making the
same comparison before month 0, the plausibility of the identification assumption can be
assessed.
Consistent with the identification assumption, prior to month 0 the age group difference
in the trend of each outcome is very similar across the two periods. In fact, up to month
5, i.e. five months after reassessments started in the reform period and by when only 8%
of claimants aged 30-44 had been reassessed, there is little sign of the age differential in the
trends differing across the periods. After that point, when the pace of reassessments picked
up in the reform period (See Appendix A Table A3), the age differentials begin to diverge
more markedly across the periods. This is consistent with the application of more stringent
eligibility criteria to ever greater numbers of younger benefit recipients in the reform period
having raised the rate at which they exited DI relative to older recipients, and with relative
increases in the employment and earnings of younger recipients who either left DI or remained
on the program despite experiencing a cut in their benefits.
Attribution of the differential trends across periods evident in Figure 1 to the reform
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Figure 1: Age group difference-in-differences in outcomes by period
A: Disability Insurance (ppt) B: Employment (ppt)
C: Labor earnings (e/year)
Note: Reform period (Jan. 2004-Dec. 2008) sample consists of individuals aged 30-44 & 50-53 on July 1,
2004 who were claiming DI in January 2004. Non-reform period (Jan. 1999-Dec. 2003) sample consists of
individuals aged 30-44 &50-53 on July 1, 1999 who were claiming DI in January 1999. Month 0 is October
2004 for reform period and October 1999 for non-reform period. Each line traces a period-specific difference-
in-differences: the mean outcome at month t minus the mean outcome at month 0 for the 30-44 age group
less the respective difference for the 50-53 age group. Group sizes are given in Table 1. ppt = percentage
points.
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rests on assumption (1) - the age differential in the outcome trend would have been common
across periods in the absence of the reform. It is difficult to gauge the plausibility of this
assumption from comparison of the outcome trends over two periods of only nine months
(Jan.-Sept. 1999 and Jan.-Sept. 2004). To better assess whether the assumption is credible,
we examine two different cohorts of DI claimants over a longer duration prior to the start of
reassessments in the reform period. One of these cohorts consists of individuals who were:
a) claiming DI in January 2003, b) aged 30-44 or 50-53 on July 1, 2004, and c) observable
until December 2006. Those in the younger group of this cohort were subject to reassessment
from October 2004, provided they were still on DI at that time. They are observed for 21
months prior to this date. The second cohort is defined exactly as the non-reform period
groups we use for estimation except that the age criteria are applied on July 1, 2000 (rather
than July 1, 1999) and we follow them only until December 2002. The pseudo reform period
for this cohort is set as starting in October 2000.
Figure 2 shows the age group differential in the trends in DI participation, employment
and labor earnings over the four years that these cohorts are followed. Over the 21 months
prior to the start of the reassessments of the reform period sample, the age differentials in
the outcome trends do not diverge markedly between the two cohorts. This is slightly less
true for DI participation than it is for the other two outcomes. Apparently even before the
start of reassessments in the reform period sample, younger claimants in this cohort were
exiting DI at a faster rate relative to older claimants than was the case in the earlier period
sample. This would be consistent with recipients in the later period leaving the program
in anticipation of negative reassessments. This seems unlikely given there is no sign of a
similar pre-reform divergence in the employment trends. Someone who anticipated that
their DI benefits would be terminated or cut would have no incentive to leave the program
before this occurred, unless they had found employment. There is a clear downward kink
in the differential trend in DI participation in the reform period sample coincident with the
acceleration in the reassessments from around month 5 and no such kink in the non-reform
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period sample. The size of this divergence relative to the prior differential trend suggests
that while the DADID may overestimate the impact of the reform on the DI exit rate, the
upward bias is likely to be small. Further, the similarity of the trends in employment and
earnings prior to month 0 across periods supports the validity of the DADID identification
assumption for these outcomes.
Figure 2: Age group difference-in-differences in outcomes by period
- extended duration prior to (pseudo) reform
A: Disability Insurance (ppt) B: Employment (ppt)
C: Labor earnings (e/year)
Note: Reform period (Jan. 2003-Dec. 2006) sample consists of individuals aged 30-44 & 50-53 on July 1,
2004 who were claiming DI in January 2003. Non-reform period (Jan. 1999-Dec. 2002) sample consists of
individuals aged 30-44 & 50-53 on July 1, 1999 who were claiming DI in January 2000. Month 0 is October
2004 for reform period and October 2000 for non-reform period.
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5 Results
5.1 Main estimates
Table 2 reports estimates of β4 from regressions (3). Each entry is a DADID estimate of
the ATET - the effect of the reform on the respective outcome in 2008 averaged over all
individuals who were aged 30-44 and claiming DI in 2004. By 2008, these individuals had
been subject to reassessment under the more stringent criteria. We estimate that this reduced
the probability of remaining on DI in 2008 by 14.4 percentage points. This includes both the
direct effect of claims terminated through application of the stricter rules and any indirect
effect that may arise through reduced benefits inducing some to leave DI. Even without the
cuts, some claimants would have left the program by 2008. Using the regression estimates,
we predict that 84.5% of individuals aged 30-44 who had been claiming DI in 2004 would still
have been on the DI roll in 2008 if there had been no tightening of the rules.15 This implies
that reassessment with stricter criteria reduced the DI participation rate by 17% of what it
otherwise would have been. It raised the DI exit rate by 93%. On average, reassessment is
estimated to have reduced the annual amount of DI benefit received by e1565, or around one
fifth of the average amount under the counterfactual. If there had been no tightening of the
eligibility criteria, we estimate that the target group of DI recipients would have been paid
benefits equivalent to 46% of their pre-disability earnings in 2008. The reform is estimated
to have reduced this replacement rate by 7.2 percentage points, on average.16
These estimates confirm that the 2004 reform substantially reduced DI benefits and
dependency. It was about twice as aggressive as the reassessment of Dutch DI claimants
a decade earlier that is estimated to have lowered the probability of remaining on DI by
3.8 percentage points, reduced benefits by 10% and decreased the replacement rate by 5.9
15 This is obtained by subtracting the estimated reform effect on DI participation from the predicted
participation rate of the treatment group in 2008, i.e. 1nT
∑
i 1 (AGEi × PERIODi × Y EAR4) Yˆit − βˆ4,
where 1() is the indicator function and nT is the number of individuals in the treatment group.
16The replacement rate is averaged over the whole treatment group and is set to zero for those who had
left DI by 2008.
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percentage points (for claimants aged 45) (Borghans et al. 2014).
Table 2: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules
Absolute Effect Mean if no
reassessment
Relative Effect
(1) (2) (1)/(2)
Disability Insurance
Benefit receipt (ppt) -14.40*** 84.52 17.04%
(0.17)
Benefit Amount (e/year) -1,565*** 7,906 19.80%
(31.70)
Replacement Rate (ppt) -7.20*** 46.19 15.59%
(0.12)
Labor Market
Employment (ppt) 6.68*** 33.83 19.76%
(0.22)
Days worked (year) 17.03*** 76.26 22.33%
(0.58)
Earnings (e/year) 995*** 5,507 18.07%
(43.19)
Wage (e/day) 4.33 65.09 6.65%
(2.50)
Other social transfers
Benefit amount (e/year) 376*** 877 42.90%
(17.73)
Number of individuals 496,586
Number of observations 2,482,930
Notes: Column (1) gives least squares estimates of β4 from (3). Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level. Column (2) gives predicted mean outcome of 30-44 year olds in 2008
under counterfactual of no reform (see footnote 15). Right-hand column gives the estimate in column (1)
as a percentage of the prediction in column (2). The number of individuals is the total across all treatment
and comparison groups. For the numbers in each group, see Table 1. ppt = percentage points. *** indicates
significance at the 1% level.
Having established that the reform substantially reduced DI benefits, we now turn to
the question of central interest: what impact did this increased stringency have on the
employment and earnings of claimants? We estimate that reassessment raised the probability
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of employment by 6.7 percentage points, which is a 20% increase relative to the predicted
employment rate of the treatment group in 2008 in the absence of the reform (Table 2). This
is the effect on employment irrespective of whether the person continues to claim DI or not.
It cannot therefore be compared with the estimated effect on DI receipt to reveal the fraction
of those forced or induced to leave DI who entered employment. In order to calculate that
fraction, we need to know the effect on the probability of working and not claiming DI. We
estimate that reassessment raised this probability by a significant 8.5 points (SE=0.18, p-
value<0.01). This is larger than the effect on the unconditional probability of employment,
implying that reassessment reduced the likelihood of working and continuing to claim DI.
This is likely due to cuts and terminations of the benefits paid to partially disabled claimants
who had been working prior to reassessment. Setting the 8.5 points rise in the probability of
working without claiming DI against the 14.4 points reduction in the probability of receiving
DI benefits implies that 62% of those forced or induced to leave DI entered employment.
This indicates substantial reserves of work capacity among DI recipients whose entitlement
was reduced. The less positive interpretation is that almost two fifths of those who were
forced or induced to leave DI did not find or look for work.
Borghans et al. (2014) estimate that the less stringent tightening of the Dutch DI program
in 1994 increased employment by 2.9 points. In absolute terms, this is less than half the
size of the effect we find on employment (unconditional on DI receipt). But it is larger
relative to the 3.8 percentage points reduction in DI participation estimated by Borghans et
al. The implied lower rate of absorption of displaced claimants from the later reform into
employment is consistent with an expected decrease in the work capacity of claimants as
the process of DI retrenchment proceeds. Moore (2015) estimates that 22% of US benefit
recipients who lost DI entitlement as a result of addictive disorders being excluded from the
qualifying conditions gained employment. This lower rate of re-entry to employment may be
attributable to the addictive behavior of the targeted group, but it could also be due to the
incentive for claimants exiting the US program to stay out of work in order to strengthen
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their case should they reapply. There is no such incentive in the Dutch system.
We estimate that greater benefit stringency increased the number of days worked annu-
ally by 17; equivalent to 22% of the predicted mean for the treatment group in the absence
of the reform. The extensive and intensive margin effects on labor supply produced an esti-
mated e995 average increase in the annual earnings of DI claimants whose entitlement was
reassessed. This is an 18% increase relative to predicted earnings under the counterfactual.
It is almost two thirds of the estimated average reduction in the benefits received. For each
e1 reduction in benefits, 64 cents could be regained through labor market earnings.17 This
is very close to the estimate of Borghans et al. that earnings rose by 61 cents for each e1 re-
duction in benefits resulting from the 1994 reassessment of Dutch DI claimants. Apparently,
even after that tightening of the eligibility criteria and a 2002 reform that is likely to have
reduced the rate of entry to DI (Koning and Lindeboom 2015), DI recipients subjected to
reassessment in 2004 still had considerable earnings capacity they could draw on to replace
a substantial part of the benefits lost due to the increased program stringency. This is even
more striking considering that those affected had been claiming DI for more than five years,
on average, and 63% were classified as fully disabled (see Table 1). However, it needs to be
borne in mind that these are average effects and reassessment did not change the benefit
entitlement of 62% of recipients (Social Insurance Benefits Agency (UWV) 2009). Among
those whose entitlement was terminated or cut, there are likely to be many who could not
increase earnings to an extent anywhere near that sufficient to replace 64% of their lost
benefit income.18
We find no significant effect on the daily wage rate, and the point estimate is positive.
17The estimated reduction in benefits is the combined effect of cuts and the response to those cuts through
claimants leaving DI. Hence, the ratio of the estimated effects on earnings and benefit income cannot be
interpreted as the rate at which earnings are crowded out by each e1 of DI benefit. But it suggests that
the rate of crowd-out is at least as high as 0.64:1. The average cut in benefits will be less than the average
reduction in benefits received.
18Also note that we are taking the ratio of two averages, not the average of a ratio. However, given that
the expected effect on earnings relative to the expected effect on benefits is a lower bound of the expectation
of the ratio of the individual earnings effect to the individual benefit effect (Cochran 2007), it is anticipated
that we underestimate the average degree to which earnings replace lost benefit income.
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This suggests that application of stricter entitlement rules did not cause recipients to leave
DI and accept worse paying jobs than they would have settled for if their benefits had not
been cut. Earnings rise because claimants are induced to work more and this is not offset
by entering less productive jobs.
We estimate that increasing the stringency of DI increased the amount received from
other social transfers by e376, on average (Table 2). This is 24% of the average reduction
in the income received from DI. The analogous estimate from Borghans et al. is that 30%
of the 1994 reduction in DI benefits was compensated through increased claims of other
benefits. Opportunities to substitute between programs may have decreased in the decade
between the reforms, but apparently not markedly. Around half of the spillover to other
programs took the form of increased receipt of unemployment insurance benefits (Appendix
B Table B1). This substitution occurs partly by default. Recipients deemed ineligible for
DI were automatically transferred to unemployment insurance if they had made sufficient
social insurance contributions prior to entering DI. The remainder of the average increase
in income from other social programs is split between means-tested welfare payments (28%)
and sickness pay (23%). The latter suggests that individuals forced or induced to leave DI
continued to have health problems that disrupted their work, at least temporarily.19 The
ability of claimants to switch from DI to other social programs constrains the impact of the
retrenchment on household, but also public, finances.
Summing the average effects on earnings and other social transfer income gives a total of
e1371, which is about 88% of the estimated average reduction in payments received from DI.
Without taking this compensation into account, on average, the cuts to DI benefits lowered
income from all sources by 11% relative to what it would have been if there had been no
reform.20 Allowing for the compensation through earnings and other transfer programs, the
19Our estimate of the impact on income from DI is gross of payments made to individuals who initially
had their benefits terminated or cut but subsequently experienced health problems that allowed them to
re-qualify for DI, or to become entitled to a higher DI benefit.
20Using the estimates from columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, -1565/(7906+5507+877)=-0.1095.
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relative decrease in mean income from all sources is only 1.3%. 21 Increased labor market
activity and dependence on other social programs greatly cushioned the relative impact of
the disability benefit cuts. But it should be kept in mind that the average effect will hide
substantially more severe income losses for some. We explore heterogeneity in section 5.3.
The estimates presented in Table 2 are generally robust to using monthly rather than
annual data (Appendix B Table B2). This avoids the inaccuracies arising from the small
fraction of recipients who were reassessed in the last quarter of 2004 and those reassessed
during 2008. The magnitudes of the estimated effects tend to be somewhat smaller with the
more disaggregated data, but the differences are not substantial.
5.2 Placebo test
The validity of our empirical strategy rests on the assumption that the age differential in the
outcome trends that would have materialized between 2004 and 2008 in the absence of the DI
reform is that which occurred between 1999 and 2003. To further assess the plausibility of this
assumption, we perform a placebo test by estimating the DADID in outcomes of individuals
who were not recipients of DI benefits, and so were not exposed to the reform, but who were
potentially affected, possibly differentially by age, by differences in labor market conditions
across the two periods. Placebo treatment and control groups are defined by age and period
analogous to those used to estimate the effect of the reform. The difference is that we only
use individuals who did not claim DI at any time between January 2004 and December 2008,
or in the non-reform period between January 1999 and December 2003. The placebo treated
individuals are the same age as the DI recipients who were reassessed (30-44 on July 1, 2004)
and are observed between 2004 and 2008. The placebo control groups are (1) 50-53 on July
1, 2004, (2) 30-44 on July 1, 1999 and (3) 50-53 on July 1, 1999. We exclude individuals
who were claiming unemployment insurance in 1999 (for non-reform period groups) or 2004
(for reform period groups) because the DI reform could potentially have affected their labor
21(-1565+995+376)/(7906+5507+877)=-0.0136.
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market opportunities by increasing the supply of labor from DI claimants. After imposing
these exclusion restrictions, there are 6.7 million individuals available for the analysis. We
use a random 50% sample of them.22
The results presented in Table 3 show precisely estimated zero effects on three of the four
labor market outcomes.23 There is a very small, but statistically significant, negative effect
on employment.24 Given the size of the estimate, its significance may simply be attributable
to the huge sample. The estimate suggests that employment of individuals aged 30-44 who
were not recipients of DI fell by only 0.8% of what it would have been in 2008 if the age
differential in the employment trends between 2004 and 2008 had been the same as that
observed between 1999 and 2003. Under the same assumption, we estimate that the DI
reform raised employment of DI recipients aged 30-44 by 20%. Hence, if anything, we may
be slightly underestimating the impact on employment. But the placebo test suggests that
any bias is marginal, and it gives no reason to doubt the validity of the identification with
respect to the effect on earnings and the other two labor market outcomes.
5.3 Sub-sample estimates
Apparently, DI recipients were able to increase their labor market earnings to replace almost
two thirds of the benefit income lost, on average. This suggests that the increased stringency
imposed by the reform was warranted. Upward revision of the assessed earnings capacity
of many claimants reduced their benefit entitlement and, consistent with the logic of the
22A memory constraint on the remote server used for the analysis precludes use of all individuals.
23The zero effect on the daily wage is not quite so precisely estimated. The moderately large standard
error is due to a few outliers that greatly increase the variance and skewness of the distribution of this
outcome. Excluding these outliers gives a point estimate of -1.58 with a standard error of 2.33.
24The direction of the estimated effect on employment may seem puzzling given that macroeconomic
conditions were better in 2004-2008 than they were in 1999-2003. But the effect is not simply a period effect.
It is an age difference in the period effect on the trend. To make this explicit, we decompose the estimate
by running (1) a DID regression across the two periods using individuals aged 30-44 in each, and (2) a
DID regression across the two age groups using individuals observed in the 2004-2008 period. The latter
produces an estimated negative effect on the employment of 30-44 year-olds: their employment improved by
less than that of 50-53 year-olds between 2004 and 2008. DID (1) produces an estimated positive effect on
employment: the employment of 30-44 year-olds increased by more in the 2004-2008 period than it did in
the 1999-2003 period. This is consistent with the positive turn of the business cycle from 2004.
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Table 3: Placebo test - application of empirical strategy with data on non-recipients of DI
Absolute
effect
Counterfactual
mean
Relative
effect
(1) (2) (1)/(2)
Employment (ppt) -0.57*** 73.43 0.78%
(0.01)
Days worked (year) -0.15 217.18 0.07%
(0.15)
Earnings (e/year) -195.90 34,061 0.58%
(125.78)
Wage (e/day) 0.46 151.81 0.30%
(3.78)
Number of individuals 3,345,789
Number of observations 16,728,945
Notes: Column (1) gives least squares estimates of β4 from (3) using individuals who did not claim DI at
any time in the respective period (1999-2003 or 2004-2008) and were not claiming UI at the beginning of the
period. Column (2) gives predicted mean outcome of 30-44 year olds in 2008 assuming the age differential in
the outcome trend 2004-2008 equals that observed 1999-2003. (see footnote 15). Right-hand column gives
the estimate in column (1) as a percentage of the prediction in column (2). Standard errors, in parentheses,
are adjusted for clustering at the individual level. The number of individuals is the total across all placebo
treatment and comparison groups. ppt = percentage points. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
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reform, they were able to respond by increasing their earnings. But the average response
potentially obscures much variation in the impact of the reform and the earnings capacity it
revealed. Such heterogeneity would be relevant for targeting the tightening of DI eligibility
criteria elsewhere. We test for heterogeneous effects by splitting the sample by age, gender,
cause and degree of disability, and estimating the regression model (3) separately for each
sub-sample. We then assess whether the effects vary with the duration for which a recipient
had been claiming DI prior to reassessment.
5.3.1 Effect by age and gender
The considerable earnings capacity detected may partly be attributable to the age of the
benefit recipients affected by the reform, who, at 30-44, are younger than those targeted by
most other DI reforms that have been evaluated.25 The top panel of Table 4 reveals that
the work and earnings responses to reassessment are even stronger among claimants aged 30
to 39.26 Their probability of employment increased by twice as much the respective increase
among those aged 40-44.27
The employment impact relative to the predicted employment rate under the counter-
factual of no reform (given in square brackets) is also twice as large for the younger of the
two treatment groups.28 The employment gain is 51% of the fall in DI participation in the
younger group. In the 40-44 age group, employment rises by a lower 38% of the reduction
in DI dependency. In absolute terms and relative to the counterfactual mean, earnings also
rise, on average, by twice as much in the 30-39 group as in the 40-44 group. The younger
25Although the 1994 Dutch reform impacted all claimants below the age of 45, the research design em-
ployed by Borghans et al. (2014) identifies the effect at the margin of that age threshold only. Karlstro¨m et al.
(2008) find no employment effect from withdrawal of special eligibility rules for those aged 60-64 to qualify
for the Swedish DI program. At the slightly younger age of 55-56, Staubli (2011) finds a positive impact
of reduced DI entitlement on employment in Austria. As mentioned in section 1, Moore (2015) finds that
younger (30-39 vs 50-61) US SSDI recipients who qualified through an addiction had a larger employment
response to the termination of their benefits.
26Splitting this group into those aged 30-34 and 35-39 reveals little further heterogeneity.
27This difference, like all other heterogeneous effects referred to in the text, is significant.
28The positive effect on days worked is also about twice as large for those aged 30-39 than it is for those
aged 40-44. For all heterogeneous effects on days worked, the daily wage rate and other social transfers, see
Appendix B Table B3.
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group is able to recover 68% of the average reduction in DI income through increased labor
market earnings, while the older group can make up only 55% of a smaller average loss.
These results consistently indicate greater work and earnings capacity among the youngest
DI recipients subjected to reassessment.29
In absolute terms, the employment response of female benefit recipients is almost twice
as large as that of male claimants (Table 4). Relative to the counterfactual, the impact
on the female employment rate is more than twice that on the male rate. Absolutely and
especially relative to the counterfactual mean, the positive impact on market earnings of
female recipients is considerably larger than the respective effect on male earnings. Women
are able to increase their earnings to replace a larger fraction of their lost DI benefits. The
average earnings effect is three quarters of the average reduction in DI income for female
recipients, compared with three fifths for male recipients. Female recipients were impacted
more by the reform and, judging by their response to it, appear to have had greater earnings
capacity.30
29Differences in the sex and disability composition of the age groups (see Appendix A Table A5), do
not account for the difference in the earnings response by age. The younger group has a stronger earnings
response irrespective of sex (Appendix B Table B4) and cause of disability (Appendix B, Table B5).
30The age difference between male and female DI recipients (Appendix A Table A6) is not responsible for
the different response by gender: within each age group, the employment and earnings effects are larger for
females than for males (Appendix B Table B4).
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Table 4: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules
by age and gender
Disability Insurance Labor Market No.
individuals
Benefit Receipt
(ppt)
Benefit Amount
(e/year)
Employment
(ppt)
Earnings
(e/year)
Age
30-39 years -16.68*** -1,823*** 8.55*** 1,248*** 330,042
(0.23) (36.09) (0.27) (51.01)
[20.19%] [24.48%] [25.17%] [23.28%]
40-44 years -11.35*** -1,225*** 4.30*** 667*** 363,412
(0.22) (39.47) (0.27) (53.30)
[12.73%] [14.06%] [12.27%] [11.29%]
H0 : β
30−39
4 = β
40−44
4 ,
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Gender
Males -8.31*** -1,375*** 4.21*** 815*** 244,076
(0.25) (49.79) (0.32) (72.91)
[9.76%] [15.55%] [10.80%] [11.05%]
Females -18.32*** -1,769*** 7.87*** 1,338*** 252,510
(0.24) (38.39) (0.32) (46.90)
[21.38%] [23.43%] [24.68%] [31.71%]
H0 : βMales4 = β
Females
4 ,
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Notes: Group-specific least squares estimates of β4 from (3) for the respective outcome. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level
in parentheses. In square brackets is the estimated effect as a percentage of the predicted mean outcome under the counterfactual calculated as in
footnote 15. p-values given for tests of equal effects across groups. Number of individuals is across all treatment and comparison groups. Number of
observations is the number of individuals multiplied by 5. ppt = percentage points. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules
by cause and degree of disability
Disability Insurance Labor Market No. indvs.
Benefit Receipt
(ppt)
Benefit Amount
(e/year)
Employment
(ppt)
Earnings
(e/year)
Cause of disability
Musculoskeletal -19.81*** -2,015*** 7.82*** 1,221*** 144,172
(0.32) (58.06) (0.42) (83.47)
[23.03%] [27.83%] [18.84%] [16.93%]
Mental -16.14*** -1,549*** 6.45*** 1,156*** 177,596
(0.27) (51.82) (0.37) (66.17)
[18.34%] [18.49%] [22.22%] [27.45%]
Other -7.80*** -1,111*** 5.48*** 620*** 174,816
(0.31) (56.36) (0.37) (76.46)
[9.40%] [13.52%] [15.33%] [10.38%]
H0 : βMusculo4 = β
Other
4 , p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
H0 : βMental4 = β
Other
4 , p-value <0.01 <0.01 0.0720 <0.01
Degree of disability
Fully disabled -10.95*** -1,656*** 8.08*** 1,037*** 324,485
(0.18) (37.49) (0.26) (38.74)
[12.22%] [17.05%] [49.93%] [51.03%]
Partially disabled -20.73*** -1,243*** 4.00*** 838*** 172,101
(0.35) (57.40) (0.41) (99.65)
[26.24%] [25.30%] [6.06%] [7.09%]
H0 : βFull4 = β
Partial
4 , p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.0670
Partially disabled
Not employed -29.25*** -2,032*** 10.9*** 1,315*** 44,087
(0.76) (156.4) (1.04) (274.3)
[32.48%] [22.72%] [53.93%] [34.50%]
Employed -19.04*** -1,383*** -0.66 548* 98,655
(0.55) (86.86) (0.41) (227)
[23.45%] [18.83%] [0.80%] [2.94%]
H0 : βNot4 = β
Employed
4 , p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Notes as Table 4
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5.3.2 Effects by cause and degree of disability
To assess the hypothesis that benefit recipients qualifying through more subjectively defined
and difficult to verify conditions have the greatest earnings capacity, we split the sample
into three groups according to main diagnosis at entry to DI: musculoskeletal disorders,
mental health disorders and a residual category of all other disorders.31 Consistent with the
hypothesis, the employment response to reassessment is largest for those with musculoskeletal
disorders, followed by those with mental health disorders (Table 5). This is entirely due to
recipients with these conditions being much more likely to exit DI after reassessment. Their
absorption into work appears to have been substantially lower. The employment effect is
around 40% of the impact on the DI exit rate for claimants with musculoskeletal and mental
health conditions. For those in the residual category of presumed more objective, verifiable
disorders, the increase in employment is 70% of the fall in DI participation. This discrepancy
could be taken as indicative of overly strict reassessment of recipients with musculoskeletal
and mental health problems that produced upwardly biased evaluation of their earnings
capacity. Their benefits were terminated and yet they were not able to find work. An
alternative interpretation is that the low absorption rate reflects greater distaste for work
among those who had qualified for DI through these two types of conditions. This is what one
would expect if the work-shy were more likely to take advantage of the difficulty of verifying
the validity of a claim of incapacity to work because of a mental health or musculoskeletal
problem. Unfortunately, we cannot assess the relative veracity of these two explanations,
which obviously have very different implications for the welfare impact of both the reform
and the DI program.
In absolute terms, the average earnings response is about twice as large for those with
musculoskeletal and mental health problems than it is for those with any other type of dis-
31The classification uses the most aggregated level of the International Classification of Diseases version
9. The residual category includes diseases and conditions related to the nervous system, many of which, such
as physical pain, are difficult to verify. Disaggregated analysis revealed that the response to the reform in
this category did not resemble the responses in the mental health and musculoskeletal categories more than
it resembled the response of recipients with the remaining diseases included in the residual category.
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order. Relative to predicted mean earnings under the counterfactual, the earnings effect is
largest for claimants with mental disorders (28%) and lowest for those in the residual cat-
egory (10%). This ranking is maintained when the earnings increase is expressed relative
to the average drop in DI income (mental health - 75%; all other disorders - 56%). Since
a larger proportion of those in the residual category who left DI entered employment, this
suggests that claimants in this group were taking lower paid jobs, or they were not increasing
labor supply at the intensive margin as much to compensate for the loss of partial disability
benefits. Overall, the results indicate that benefit recipients with mental health and muscu-
loskeletal problems did indeed have greater capacity to increase earnings in response to cuts
in DI benefits, which were more aggressive for these claimants.32
The estimates in the middle panel of Table 5 indicate that reassessment reduced the DI
participation rate of those initially partially disabled by twice as much as it raised partic-
ipation of the fully disabled. Despite this, the employment effect on the former group is
only half as large as that on the latter group. The differential impact on program partic-
ipation is because a downward revision in the degree of disability could bring a partially
disabled benefit recipient below the 15% threshold necessary to qualify for any DI, while
the same reduction might push a fully disabled recipient into a partial disability category.
The differential impact on employment is because 68 percent of partially disabled recipients
were working initially, compared with 18 percent of the fully disabled (Appendix A Table
A8). Obviously, there is greater scope for those in the latter group to enter work. This is
confirmed in the bottom panel, which shows that reassessment raised the employment of
the partially disabled who were not working initially by almost much as it raised the em-
ployment of the fully disabled. Absolutely, and particularly relative to the counterfactual
mean, benefit recipients who were initially fully disabled increased their earnings by more
than the partially disabled. This is because the benefits of the fully disabled were cut more
32These differences do not simply reflect sex, age and degree of disability differences by cause of disability
(Appendix A Table A7). The earnings responses are largest for those with mental and musculoskeletal
conditions within all sex, age and degree of disability groups (Appendix B Tables B6 and B5).
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aggressively. Relative to the average loss of benefit income, the average increase in earnings
is similar (63-68%). It is notable that recipients who had been classified as fully disabled
were able to increase earnings to an extent sufficient to replace more than three fifths of the
benefit income they lost.33
5.3.3 Effects by duration of claim
We motivated this paper by arguing that available evidence indicating that rejected DI
applicants have substantial earnings capacity is a poor guide to the effectiveness of measures
that raise the exit rate from DI if earnings capacity deteriorates while receiving DI. While we
have established that Dutch DI recipients did have considerable earnings capacity that could
be tapped to replace a large fraction of the benefit income lost, we have not yet examined
whether earnings potential does diminish with the length of a DI spell. We do so in this
subsection.
Following Moore (2015), we extend equation 3 to allow the effect of the reform on earnings
to vary with the duration of a claim. Let DURATIONi be the number of years an individual
had been receiving DI benefits at entry to the sample (January 1999 for the non-reform
period and January 2004 for the reform period). We interact a third order polynomial of
this duration with the product of the age group, period and year indicators that identifies
exposure to the reform and so allow the effect of reassessment to vary nonlinearly with the
duration of a claim.
Yit =
4∑
t=1
3∑
j=0
βtj
(
AGEi × PERIODi × Y EARt ×DURATION ji
)
(4)
+
4∑
t=1
3∑
j=0
θit
(
Y EARt ×DURATION ji
)
+
4∑
t=1
3∑
j=0
γit
(
AGEi × Y EARt ×DURATION ji
)
+
4∑
t=1
3∑
j=0
δit
(
PERIODi × Y EARt ×DURATION ji
)
+ µi + εit
33The remainder of the loss of DI income was replaced by increased payments from other social transfer
programs (see Appendix B Table B3).
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Under the DADID identification assumption (1), the average treatment effect on those ex-
posed to the reform and its nonlinear variation with the duration of a claim are obtained
from the β4j parameters. β40 corresponds to the effect of reassessment on someone who had
just entered DI in January 2004. Adding combinations of the parameters β41, β42 and β43
gives effects at positive durations. Estimates of these parameters are separately and jointly
statistically significant (Appendix B Table B7) and imply that the effects do indeed vary
with the duration of a claim. This variation is traced in Figure 3. We show estimates up to
a duration of 15 years, which corresponds to the 80th percentile in the treatment group. The
95% confidence intervals (shaded) become wide and uninformative beyond that value. The
absolute effect on all four outcomes declines as the time on DI lengthens. The diminishing ef-
fects on employment and earnings are consistent with the hypothesis that work and earnings
capacity deteriorate while on DI. It is striking, however, that there is a significant earnings
response even from individuals who had been claiming DI for 15 years. It is only around
e450 per year, but it needs to be remembered that this is an average over all recipients and
many experienced no cut in their DI benefits.
The effects on all four outcomes are rather constant up to a claim duration of about two
years. Thereafter, they decline rapidly with the length of a claim and begin to flatten out
only after about 13 years. This pattern does not resemble the inverted U-shaped employment
response to DI terminations that Moore (2015) finds with US data. In that study, the
response increases by about 8 percentage points up to a claim duration of three years. Moore
suggests this could be due to a rehabilitation effect: time on DI provides an opportunity
to recover health and work capacity. We find little or no evidence consistent with this
hypothesis. Besides the obvious institutional differences, the discrepancy may be partly
due to the different nature of the reforms examined. Moore estimates the response to a
reasonably homogeneous treatment: the termination of DI benefits. In our case, while
all claimants were reassessed, the consequences for their benefits differed. This complicates
assessment of how the employment and earnings responses differ with claim duration. Panels
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A and B of the figure show that reassessment impacted less on the DI benefits of claimants
who had been on the program for longer. Up to a claim duration of about 8 years, the
average effect on earnings is approximately half the size of the average effect on DI benefits.
Thereafter, the fraction of the benefit cut that was replaced by earnings rises with claim
duration. Reassessment provoked a smaller earnings response from DI recipients with longer
claim durations because it withdrew less of their benefits. However, it was earnings capacity
that was being reassessed. The muted effect on the entitlement of recipients with longer
claim durations itself indicates that they had, or were perceived by the assessors to have,
less potential to increase their work effort.
The relationship between the earnings effect of reassessment and claim duration differs
markedly by age and sex (Figure 4 Panels A and B). The earnings response starts out much
larger and declines more steeply with claim duration in the younger group. Earnings capacity
is greatest among younger (30-39) beneficiaries who had been claiming DI for fewer years.
In the older group (40-44), the earnings response varies less with claim duration, although
there is some sign of the inverted U-shape found by Moore (2015), which is consistent with a
period on DI providing time to regain earnings capacity before the offsetting effect of labor
market detachment begins to dominate. The earnings effect declines steeply with length
of time on DI among males but not females. It is remarkable that the average increase in
earnings resulting from reassessment is in excess of e1000 per year among women who have
been claiming DI for fifteen years.34
The earnings response to reassessment declines more steeply with time on DI among fully
disabled recipients than it does for the partially disabled (panel C). Splitting the partially
disabled by initial employment status reveals that the earnings response-claim duration
relationship mainly differs with the latter characteristic (panel D). The earnings response of
the partially disabled who were not initially employed falls steeply with time claiming DI.
34Partly due to the difference by sex, the earnings response declines more steeply with claim duration
among recipients with musculoskeletal conditions, who are more likely to be male (Appendix B Figure B1.
The earnings response curve is flatter for those with mental health problems, who are more likely to be
female.
38
Figure 3: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules
by duration of claim
A: DI Benefit receipt (ppt) B: DI Benefit amount (e/year)
C: Employment (ppt) D: Earnings (e/year)
Notes: Estimates of average effects of reassessment by length of time on DI at entry to the sample. Derived
from least squares estimates of β4j , j = 0, 1, 2, 3 from (4) ((Appendix B Table B7). Shading indicates 95%
confidence interval computed from delta method standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual
level. ppt = percentage points. Sample size is 496,586 individuals and 2,482,930 observations.
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Figure 4: Earnings effect of reassessment by duration of claim - heterogeneity
A: Age B: Gender
C: Degree of disability D: Partially disabled
Notes: Estimates of average effects of reassessment under stricter DI criteria by length of time on DI at entry
to the sample. Derived from least squares estimates of β4j , j = 0, 1, 2, 3 from (4) estimated separately for
each sub-sample. Shading indicates 95% confidence interval computed from delta method standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the individual level. Sample sizes is given in Tables 4 and 5.
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After a duration of 3.5 years, there is no significant earnings response from this group. In
contrast, the earnings response of the partially disabled who were initially working is always
significant, and it is as strong for those who had been on DI for 15 years as it is for those
who had just entered DI when the reassessments started. This is consistent with partial
disability combined with employment being effective in maintaining earnings capacity as the
time claiming DI lengthens.
6 Conclusion
To design policies that can relieve the fiscal strain caused by swelling disability insurance
programs while protecting the wellbeing of those claimants who have little latitude to raise
their labor market earnings, it is critical to know the earnings capacity of benefit recipients
and how this varies with characteristics that can potentially be used to target interventions.
This paper is one of only a few that deliver evidence on the employment and earnings
responses of DI recipients to benefit cuts. Using a reform that affected Dutch DI recipients
aged 30-44, we find that reassessment of entitlement under more stringent rules reduced
benefits by around 20 percent, on average, and reduced dependency on the program by 14.4
percentage points. These cuts produced a 6.7 percentage points increase in employment and
a 8.5 point increase in the probability of working and not claiming DI. Setting the latter
against the fall in program dependency implies that three fifths of those forced or induced
to leave DI entered employment. We estimate that the benefit cuts induced an 18 percent
average increase in earnings. Each euro of DI income lost was replaced by 64 cents of labor
earnings. We find no significant effect on the daily wage. Benefits recipients who were
induced or forced to leave DI do not appear to have been pushed into less productive jobs.
These findings confirm that prior to the 2004 reform, some recipients of disability benefits
in the Netherlands had substantial capacity to substitute earnings for benefits. Since the
earnings response could come from an income effect as well as being due to disqualified
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claimants no longer facing work disincentives that are built into DI rules, we do not know
the extent to which it is indicative of inefficiency in the form of transfers crowding out
earnings by reducing the return to work. It could also be that claimants impacted by the
reform choose to enter work, or to work longer hours, because they have less non-labor
income. Recent evidence suggests that much, perhaps even all, of the earnings crowd-out
from US SSDI is an income effect (Gelber et al. 2017). In the Dutch context, it seems likely
that a substantial part of the earnings response is indicative of inefficient moral hazard.
One reason is that the response is so large. It is unlikely that this could be generated by
an income effect alone. A second reason is that even a decade into retrenchment of the
Dutch DI program, the dependency rate was still substantially higher than it is in the US.
This reflected laxer qualification criteria and higher replacement rates that made the system
vulnerable to moral hazard. The 2004 reform was intended to correct this. A third reason is
that we find a stronger earnings response from benefit recipients who had qualified through
mental health and musculoskeletal conditions that are the most difficult to verify. Without
doubt, many, probably most, claimants who qualify for DI through these conditions have
little capacity to earn sufficiently to support themselves and their families. However, we find
that, on average, these claimants have greater potential to increase their earnings in response
to benefit cuts than do claimants with other conditions.
Our finding of large employment and earnings responses to disability benefit cuts does
not mean that all recipients of DI benefits in the Netherlands, or even a majority of them,
have abundant earnings capacity. While all benefit recipients younger than 45 had their
entitlement reassessed under stricter criteria, benefits were left unchanged for around two
thirds of them. The strong earnings response is from the third who lost benefits. Across-
the-board cuts in DI benefits would reduce the gains from insurance and cause hardship
among many benefit recipients who would be unable to raise their earnings to make up the
loss of income. The difficulty lies in discriminating between claimants who do and do not
have the capacity to replace benefits with earnings. Our analysis reveals that those who do
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are disproportionately younger and female, and that earnings potential is also higher among
those who have been claiming DI for a shorter period, are diagnosed with a more subjectively
defined health condition and are claiming partial disability benefits while working.
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Appendices
A Additional Descriptives
Table A1: Disability Insurance replacement rate per degree of disability
Degree of disability
Benefit paid as %
of pre-disability
earnings
0-15% 0
15-25% 14%
25-35% 21%
35-45% 28%
45-55% 35%
55-65% 42%
65-80% 50.75%
80-100% 70%
Note: Replacement rates prior to 2006. Source Social Insurance Benefits Agency (UWV).
Table A2: Reclassification of degree of disability following reassessments, recipients aged
30-44 on July 1, 2004
Degree of disability after reassessment
<15% 15-25% 25-35% 35-45% 45-55% 55-65% 65-80% 80-100%
15-25% 47.93 35.47 6.27 1.82 0.92 0.75 0.44 6.40
Degree of 25-35% 29.67 18.71 34.86 5.56 2.04 1.02 0.75 7.39
disability 35-45% 23.77 9.81 16.37 31.81 5.77 1.57 1.41 9.49
before 45-55% 25.75 5.27 6.41 9.67 32.34 4.22 2.09 14.25
reassessment 55-65% 23.74 6.91 5.57 5.58 10.61 25.89 4.59 17.10
65-80% 16.60 5.51 6.86 7.20 7.07 8.44 26.71 21.61
80-100% 17.05 2.49 2.09 1.76 1.92 1.37 1.45 71.87
Notes: Authors’ calculations using Social Insurance Benefits Agency (UWV) data.
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Table A3: Reassessments of DI recipients aged 30-44 on July 1, 2004 by year
Number Cumulative %
2004 (Oct-Dec) 1,608 1.17
2005 61,612 46.01
2006 48,073 80.99
2007 21,480 96.62
2008 4,555 99.93
2009 91 100
TOTAL 137,419
footnotesize Notes: Authors’ calculations using Social Insurance Benefits Agency (UWV)
data. The table shows the timing of the reassessments of the 137,419 recipients aged 30-44
on July 1, 2004 who were called to have their entitlement reviewed under the new rules.
An additional 22,775 recipients in this cohort were not reassessed. Most of them (94%) had
a condition that was considered, without being subject to the full reassessment process, to
render them completely incapable of work. The remainder left DI before being called for
reassessment).
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Table A4: Data sources and variable definitions
Variable Source Definition Timing and Units
I. Disability Insurance
Benefit receipt SSB Files Recorded claiming 0/1 dummy
DI any time in year
Benefit amount SSB Files DI benefit income e/year;
after tax 2015 prices
Degree of disability SSB Files Category of disability At entry to sample
(0-15%, January 1999 or 2004
15-25%, 25-35%, 35-45%,
45-55%, 55-65%, 65-80%, 80-100%).
Partially disabled if DD (< 80%)
Fully disabled if DD (≥ 80%)
Cause of disability SSB Files Initial main diagnosis At entry to sample
in 3 categories: January 1999 or 2004
i) mental,
ii) musculoskeletal, iii) other
Duration SSB Files Years claiming DI At entry to sample
January 1999 or 2004
II. Labor market
Employment Tax Files If have income from 0/1 dummy
paid employment in year
Days worked Tax Files Annual days worked Days
Earnings Tax Files Net annual earnings from paid employment e/year
2015 prices
Wage Tax Files Earnings/Day worked e/day
2015 prices
III. Other social transfers
Benefit amount SSB Files Net income from e/year
Unemployment Insurance, 2015 prices
means-tested programs,
Sickness Pay
Note: SSB = Social Statistical Database. When using monthly data, we construct a monthly indicator of
employment from the start and end dates of employment spells recorded in the SSB.
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Table A5: Characteristics of DI recipients exposed to reassessment
Means at sample entry by age
Aged 40-44 Aged 30-39
Panel A: Demographics
Females 47.39% 54.79%
Year of Birth 1956.38 1961.41
Panel B: Disability insurance
Claim duration (years) 7.35 6.57
Benefit amount (euros/year) 8918 8811
Fully disabled 63.48% 62.71%
Panel C: Labor market
Employment 40.24% 36.64%
Earnings (e/year) 5232 4638
Panel D: Other social transfers
Benefit amount (e/year) 688 971
Panel D: Diagnosis
Mental disorders 33.21% 40.94%
Muskuloskeletal disorders 26.83% 29.85%
Other disabilities 39.96% 29.20%
Number of Individuals 62,688 70,486
Notes as Table A6
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Table A6: Characteristics of DI recipients exposed to reassessment
Means at sample entry by gender
Males Females
Panel A: Demographics
Year of Birth 1964.71 1965.68
Panel B: Disability insurance
Claim duration (years) 5.32 5.52
Benefit amount (e/year) 8783 8184
Fully disabled 59.78% 65.91%
Panel C: Labor market
Employment 40.71% 32.78%
Earnings (e/year) 5520 3342
Panel D: Other social transfers
Benefit amount (e/year) 1344 845
Panel D: Diagnosis
Mental disorders 40.03% 45.14%
Muskuloskeletal disorders 33.87% 25.55%
Other disabilities 26.10% 29.31%
Number of Individuals 63,614 96,580
Note: DI recipients are selected in January 2004. Money amounts inflated to 2015 price levels (Eurostat
Netherlands HCPI 2015).
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Table A7: Characteristics of DI recipients exposed to reassessment
Means at sample entry by cause of disability
Mental
Disorders
Musculoskeletal
Disorders
Other
Disabilities
Panel A: Demographics
Females 63.13% 53.39% 63.03%
Year of Birth 1965.53 1965.14 1965.09
Panel B: Disability insurance
Claim duration (years) 5.42 5.06 5.86
Benefit amount (e/year) 9116 7264 8546
Fully disabled 72.53% 50.52% 62.87%
Panel C: Labor market
Employment 29.34% 43.22% 38.56%
Earnings (e/year) 3074 5344 4780
Panel D: Other social transfers
Benefit amount (e/year) 955 1376 838
Number of Individuals 69,057 46,225 44,912
Notes as Table A6
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Table A8: Characteristics of DI recipients exposed to reassessment
Means at sample entry by degree of disability
Fully Disabled Partially
Disabled
Panel A: Demographics
Females 62.60% 56.27%
Year of Birth 1965.36 1965.17
Panel B: Disability insurance
Claim duration (years) 5.95 4.55
Benefit amount (e/year) 10528 4761
Panel C: Labor market
Employment 17.55% 67.87%
Earnings (e/year) 1435 9025
Panel D: Other social transfers
Benefit amount (e/year) 539 1921
Panel D: Diagnosis
Mental disorders 49.26% 32.42%
Muskuloskeletal disorders 22.97% 39.09%
Other disabilities 27.77% 28.50%
Number of Individuals 101,679 58,515
Notes as Table A6
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B Additional Results
Table B1: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules on income from
other social transfers
Absolute effect Mean if no re-
assessment
Relative effect
(1) (2) (1)/(2)
Unemployment Insurance (e/year) 182.22*** 396.34 45.60%
(13.25)
Means-tested welfare (e/year) 106.26*** 345.54 30.72%
(14.28)
Sick Pay (e/year) 86.42*** 185.36 46.56%
(6.85)
Number of individuals 496,586
Number of observations 2,482,930
Notes: Column (1) gives least squares estimates of β4 from (3). Column (2) gives predicted mean outcome of
30-44 year olds in 2008 under the counterfactual of no reassessments. Right-hand column gives the estimate
in column (1) as a percentage of the prediction in column (2). Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level. Sick pay refers to publicly provided sickness benefits. *** indicates
significance at the 1% level.
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Table B2: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules - Estimates
using annual and monthly data
Annual data Monthly data
(1) (2)
Disability Insurance
Benefit receipt (ppt) -14.40*** -13.57***
(0.17) (0.37)
Benefit amount (e/year) -1,565*** -1,521***
(31.70) (65.17)
Replacement rate (ppt) -7.20*** -7.78***
(0.12) (0.25)
Labor Market
Employment (ppt) 6.68*** 5.67***
(0.22) (0.46)
Days worked (year) 17.03*** 15.46***
(0.58) (1.23)
Earnings (e/year) 995*** 784***
(43.19) (93.12)
Wage (e/day) 4.33 3.98
(2.50) (1.50)
Number of individuals 496,586
Notes: Column (1) gives least squares estimates of β4 from (3) using annual data. Column
(2) gives equivalent estimates obtained using monthly data. In this case, differences are taken
relative to September 2004 (in reform period) and estimated effects at December 2008 are
presented. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering at the individual level.
To get number of observations, multiply number of individuals by 5 for annual data and by
60 for monthly data. ppt = percentage points. Significance levels: *** = 1%.
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Table B3: Heterogeneous effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules on additional outcomes
Labor Market Other Social Transfers
Days worked in year Wage (e/day) Benefit amount (e/year) No. individuals
Panel A: Age
Aged 30-39 21.25*** 4.51 331.53*** 330,042
(0.70) (2.49) (21.17)
[28.41%] [7.05%] [33.13%]
Aged 40-44 11.60*** 4.03 432.28*** 363,412
(0.71) (3.40) (22.31)
[14.17%] [6.04%] [55.96%]
Panel B: Gender
Males 12.40*** 4.78 65.57*** 244,076
(0.91) (2.95) (27.78)
[12.45%] [7.09%] [5.53%]
Females 21.95*** 7.16 575.99*** 252,510
(0.72) (6.71) (22.03)
[35.50%] [11.87%] [80.39%]
Panel C: Cause of disability
Mental disorders 18.48*** 4.55 443.89*** 177,596
(0.89) (5.64) (29.81)
[30.55%] [7.20%] [48.96%]
Musculoskeletal disorders 20.88*** 2.68 318.52*** 144,172
(1.15) (3.89) (33.94)
[21.19%] [3.94%] [30.51%]
Other disabilities 12.04*** 5.58 324.08*** 174,816
(0.99) (3.88) (29.48)
[14.70%] [8.65%] [43.43%]
Panel D: Degree of disability
Fully disabled 18.32*** 0.41 679.97*** 324,485
(0.57) (4.68) (18.07)
[54.73%] [0.71%] [94.15%]
Partially disabled 13.21*** 6.36** -141.89*** 98,655
(1.25) (2.98) (37.73)
[8.49%] [9.17%] [11.83%]
Least squares estimates of β4 from (3). Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering at the individual level. In brackets is effect as
percentage of the predicted mean outcome of 30-44 year olds in 2008 under the counterfactual of no reassessment. *** indicates significance at the
1% level.
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Table B4: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules by age and degree of disability within gender
Males Females
Estimate Mean if no
reform
Estimate Mean if no
reform
Estimate Mean if no
reform
Estimate Mean if no
reform
Aged 30-39 Aged 40-44 Aged 30-39 Aged 40-44
Disability Insurance
Benefit receipt (ppt) -9.57 81.49% -6.97 88.84% -20.53 83.19% -15.00 89.48%
(0.35) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32)
Benefit Amount (e/year) -1,536.89 8,045.69 -1,202.49 9,627.01 -1,905.87 7,047.52 -1,212.89 7,927.82
(59.54) (61.48) (43.25) (48.02)
Labor Market
Employment (ppt) 5.60 38.36% 2.81 39.59% 9.72 31.98% 5.07 31.71%
(0.42) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39)
Days worked (year) 16.79 96.49 7.94 102.66 26.18 60.51 15.56 63.78
(1.18) (1.08) (0.85) (0.90)
Earnings (e/year) 1,156.49 7,156.52 465.28 7,589.20 1,584.13 4,098.25 968.59 4,404.13
(92.58) (87.15) (55.03) (60.14)
Wage (e/day) 4.64 66.89 4.84 67.98 8.36 58.25 5.05 63.89
(3.23) (4.05) (6.62) (7.74)
Other social transfers
Benefit Amount (e/year) -41.69 1,353.31 172.37 1,019.65 527.88 815.70 649.83 565.40
(35.04) (34.28) (25.84) (28.05)
Number of Individuals 180,884 182,041 185,100 150,745
Fully Disabled Partially disabled Fully Disabled Partially Disabled
Disability Insurance
Benefit receipt (ppt) -4.85 90.23% -14.53 79.14% -14.52 89.25% -25.89 79.28%
(0.26) (0.46) (0.25) (0.59)
Benefit Amount (e/year) -1,327.75 13,685.00 -1,423.55 66,89.84 -1,656.27 11,170.75 -1,886.19 5,434.19
(84.09) (104.72) (55.73) (118.24)
Labor Market
Employment (ppt) 4.57 20.15% 3.50 66.64% 9.73 14.29% 3.13 66.69%
(0.40) (0.52) (0.35) (0.71)
Days worked (year) 11.76 46.04 13.82 177.16 22.17 26.10 14.83 136.84
(0.94) (1.74) (0.71) (1.88)
Earnings (e/year) 779.38 3,724.74 1,026.74 19,172.48 1,471.23 1,962.48 1,286.11 12,775.26
(98.63) (206.79) (57.98) (181.87)
Wage (e/day) -0.45 82.90 12.65 94.92 3.59 69.15 13.56 82.51
(9.11) (5.87) (14.39) (14.34)
Other public benefits
Benefit Amount (e/year) 403.12 1,191.48 -757.02 2,240.90 937.88 793.10 78.55 1,047.52
(40.67) (71.39) (28.26) (78.17)
Number of Individuals 197,909 145,494 232,406 104,020
Least squares estimates of β4 from (3). Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering at the individual level.
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Table B5: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules by age and cause of disability
Aged 30-39 Aged 40-44
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Musculoskeletal Mental disorders Other disabilities Musculoskeletal Mental disorders Other disabilities
Disability Insurance
Disability (ppt) -20.02 79.72% -19.89 87.24% -3.86 73.96% -11.06 85.08% -12.14 0.90 -9.12 81.27%
(0.28) (0.31) (0.86) (0.71) (0.21) (0.12)
Benefit Amount (e/year) -2,526.33 7,653.34 -1,790.62 9,805.52 -1,138.82 9,044 -1,214 9,215 -1,338 11,300 -1,046 10,670
(378) (545) (372) (306) (599) (459)
Labor Market
Employment (ppt) 8.86 45.57% 9.18 28.07% 6.31 37.57% 3.99 44.55% 4.89 0.30 2.15 43.39%
(0.71) (0.36) (0.34) (0.23) (0.71) (0.20)
Days worked (year) 28.49 80.21 21.13 50.80 16.91 38.91 10.03 19.90 9.93 64.96 8.13 91.80
(1.85) (1.86) (2.76) (2.44) (1.54) (3.74)
Earnings (e/year) 1,653 9,681 1,312 5,747 708 8,777 1,015 9,832 698 6452 464 7,613
(116) (110) (107) (171) (78.3) (230)
Wage (e/year) 4.63 88.41 -4.25 89.96 1.83 89.34 3.69 81.83 8.89 75.23 4.82 95.24
(10.77) (3.38) (6.69) (1.89) (7.23) (3.80)
Other social transfers
Benefit Amount (e/year) 540 1159 173 1,513 122 1,207 -156 1,721 981 544 1,818 1,261
(108) (33.41) (181) (27.04) (835) (1,864)
Number of Individuals 109,246 149,833 106,867 89,286 110,518 132,981
Least squares estimates of β4 from (3). Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering at the individual level.
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Table B6: Effects of reassessment of DI recipients under more stringent rules by cause of disability and gender
Musculoskeletal Mental Other disabilities Musculoskeletal Mental Other disabilities
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Estimate Mean if
no
reform
Males Females
Disability Insurance
Disability (ppt) -13.14 85.10% -9.29 88.17% -2.14 82.51% -25.94 87.14% -20.03 87.80% -11.06 83.26%
(0.44) (0.39) (0.45) (0.48) (0.37) (0.43)
Benefit Amount (e/year) -252.67 2,030.29 126.83 1,379.70 -34.93 1,348.38 681.21 835.23 678.29 1005.24 498.30 790.64
(67.17) (67.32) (66.16 ) ( 58.32) (48.20) (46.54)
-1,883.30 9,464.59 -1,381.61 12,001.82 -548.08 11,368.09 -2,203.01 8,043.72 -1,972.94 9,537.65 -1,450.15 9,660.77
(107.03) (113.53) (123.50 ) (92.38) (80.55) (92.72)
Labor Market
Employment (ppt) 5.41 48.71% 3.53 29.73% 3.10 40.98% 8.91 36.30% 7.71 29.05% 6.85 32.68%
(0.55) ( 0.54) ( 0.55) ( 0.65 ) (0.52) (0.52)
Days worked (year) 18.04 127.93 12.51 69.57 6.62 106.57 25.60 70.66 21.94 55.28 18.19 64.71
(1.71) (1.40) (1.61) (1.47) (1.14) (1.21)
Earnings (e/year) 1,743.90 12,238.23 1,121.46 6671.89 454.43 10,726.13 1,978.59 5,887.98 1,510.24 4,691.40 1,163.77 5,654.61
(186.36) (165.64 ) (239.80) (121.81) (102.78) (113.53)
Wage (e/year) 9.75 93.28 13.52 81.50 6.06 91.09 -4.56 89.43 2.38 83.40 19.67 70.55
(6.74) (16.88) (5.50) (14.87) (7.29) (21.29)
Other social transfers
Benefit Amount (e/year) -252.67 2,030.29 126.83 1,379.70 -34.93 1,348.38 681.21 835.23 678.29 1,005.24 498.30 790.64
(67.17) (67.32) (66.16) (58.32) (48.20) (46.54)
Number of Individuals 116,546 137,743 89,810 85,980 151,903 98,632
Fully Disabled Partially Disabled
Disability Insurance
Disability (ppt) -16.79 90.64% -12.70 91.45% -4.66 87.27% -24.04 82.46% -23.87 77.57% -13.51 76.88%
(0.38) (0.26) (0.32) (0.53) (0.72) (0.61)
Benefit Amount (e/year) -2,350.08 11,419.04 -1,956.68 12,187.92 -1,150.74 12,488.20 -1,399.51 5,588.70 -1,357.09 5,974.24 -1,213.94 6,841.23
(99.48) (73.32) (89.76) (113.23) (168.99) (139.68)
Labor Market
Employment (ppt) 11.28 16.62% 7.05 16.17% 6.81 16.27% 3.93 67.23% 4.66 62.93% 2.96 68.02%
(0.57) (0.40) (0.45) (0.63) (0.90) (0.66)
Days worked (year) 24.68 35.55 17.77 31.59 13.85 35.16 12.85 166.66 19.17 137.51 7.11 160.82
(1.25) (0.85) (1.00) (2.03) (2.52) (2.09)
Earnings (e/year) 1,856.38 2,762.82 1,309.48 2,500.11 961.04 2,870.39 1,199.67 16,955.76 1,447.35 14,321.14 507.11 16,552.71
(109.92) (81.26) (99.91) (217.39) (293.38) (240.73)
Wage (e/day) -12.68 90.48 9.34 66.19 0.79 75.73 9.36 91.29 10.40 90.66 12.33 89.44
(22.54) (20.44) (8.43) (6.49) (11.90) (8.15)
Other public benefits
Benefit Amount (e/year) 841.46 1,152.88 698.29 975.26 586.24 839.01 -312.17 1,589.46 -21.52 1,502.57 -80.92 1,142.16
(50.81) (38.42) (41.47) (78.89) (120.50) (82.25)
Number of Individuals 98,843 211,973 119,498 97,535 80,892 71,111
Least squares estimates of β4 from (3). Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering at the individual level.
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Table B7: Coefficients on interaction between reform exposure and third-order polynomial
of DI claim duration
Disability Insurance Labor Market
Benefit
Receipt (ppt)
Benefit
Amount
(e/year)
Employment
(ppt)
Earnings
(e/year)
β40 -16.87*** -1865.14*** 7.56*** 921.53***
(1.31) (498.45) (0.94) (215.29)
β41 -0.5838** -51.47*** 0.0193*** 31.98*
(0.2326) (18.54) (0.0073) (17.20)
β42 0.2237*** 16.82*** -0.1623 -3.06
(0.0214) (4.24) (0.1824) (3.87)
β43 -0.0078*** -0.2872*** 0.0096*** 0.0567**
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0248)
H0 : β40 = β41 = β42 = 0,
p-value
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Number of individuals 496,586 496,586 496,586 496,586
Notes: Least squares estimates of β4jj = 0, 1, 2, 3 from (4). Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
individual level in parentheses. ppt = percentage points. The number of individuals is the total across all
treatment and comparison groups. For the numbers in each group, see Table 1. Number of observations is
the number of individuals multiplied by 5. ***, ** & * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.
Figure B1: Relationship between earnings response to reassessment and duration of DI claim
by cause of disability
Notes: Estimates of average effects of reassessment under stricter DI criteria by length of time on DI at entry
to the sample. Derived from least squares estimates of β4j , j = 0, 1, 2, 3 from (4) estimated separately for
each sub-sample. Shading indicates 95% confidence interval computed from delta method standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the individual level.
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